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1	 Shortened	version	
of	this	article	is	inc-
luded	in	OSW	paper	
on	EU’s	external	
energy	policy	
(June	2011).
2	 Since	2001,	
The	European	Com-
mission	and	the	DG	
Competition	have	
been	applying	pres-
sure	for	the	removal	
of	destination	clau-
ses	from	gas	supply	
contracts	and	
succeded	in	several	
cases	for	example:	
NIGERIA	LNG-Enel,	
ENI-Gazprom,	
E.on-Gazprom,	
OMV-Gazprom,	
Sonetrach-Gas	
Natural,	
Sonatrach-ENI.
The EU internal market 
– a stake or a tool in European-Russian gas relations 
The	case	of	new	member	states	gas	policy1
Agata Łoskot-Strachota (OSW) 
in cooperation with William Ramsay* (ifri)
Since 2010 we have observed a new quality in EU energy policy. It is 
related to the European Commission’s more or less direct engagement in 
the bilateral gas relations of a part of the new member states – Poland, 
Bulgaria and Lithuania – with Russia. Although the long term outcome of 
this activity of the EC is as yet unclear it seems to be important for several 
reasons. Firstly it might increase the possibilities of the enforcement of the 
EU’s directives liberalising the internal gas market and specifically their 
implementation in individual gas agreements with suppliers from third co-
untries (Gazprom). The consistency and determination of the EC in this 
field may be decisive for the future direction and depth of the liberalisation 
of the EU gas market. Furthermore, present developments may lead to an 
increase in EU and specifically EC competence in the field of energy policy, 
especially its external dimension.
So what lessons can we draw from recent Commission activities 
on the following issues:
– Implementing EU gas market 2nd and 3rd liberalisation packages 
and their main provisions
– EU energy policy and its external dimension – recent developments 
and the EU’s role
– EU-Russia gas relations – where Russian and EU interests diverge.
A look at Polish-Russian negotiations
In	autumn	2010,	after	 the	European	Commission	had	 repeatedly	expressed	 its	concerns	
over	whether	 the	conditions	of	 the	agreement	negotiated	between	Poland	and	Russia	on	
the	supply	and	transit	of	Russian	gas	were	compatible	with	EU	law,	the	Commissioner	for	
Energy	Gunther	Oettinger	and	Director	General	for	Energy	Philip	Lowe	became	involved	in	
the	ongoing	 intergovernmental	negotiations.	This	event	was	unprecedented.	Although	the	
European	Commission	had	previously	on	occasion	applied	pressure	on	EU	companies	 to	
make	their	gas	supply	contracts	more	adherent	to	EU	competition	norms2	before	now	it	had	
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not	directly	participated	 in	bilateral	 relations	or	ongoing	negotiations	between	a	member	
state	and	an	external	fuel	supplier.	This	type	of	involvement	for	the	European	Commission	
in	the	case	of	Poland	was	possible	due	to	the	existence	alongside	the	corporate	contracts	
of	an	intergovernmental	agreement	for	the	supply	and	transit	of	gas	and	also	due	to	formal	
consent,	if	not	invitation,	from	the	Polish	government	to	participate	in	talks.
The	European	Commission’s	involvement	was	above	all	focused	on	the	specification	of	in-
dividual	principles	for	the	transit	of	gas	through	the	Polish	section	of	the	Yamal-Europe	gas	
pipeline	and	issues	connected	to	the	functioning	of	this	pipeline.	The	European	Commis-
sion	joining	the	bilateral	talks	led	to	the	attainment	of	the	formal	conformity	of	the	Polish-	
-Russian	 gas	 contract	with	 the	 norms	 of	 the	 EU	 gas	market	 (the	 Second	Package)	 i.e.	
the	securing	of	provisions	guaranteeing	third	party	access	(TPA)	to	the	Yamal-Europe	gas	
pipeline	and	the	appointment	of	an	inde-
pendent	operator	administering	the	Polish	
section	of	 the	pipeline.	 It	 is	nevertheless	
unclear	how	the	implementation	of	the	ne-
gotiated	provisions	will	be	accomplished.	
Little	is	known	about	the	actual	abilities	of	
the	new	operator	of	the	Polish	segment	of	
the	pipeline,	Gaz	System,	and	whether	it	
will	be	capable	of	implementing	the	prin-
ciple	of	TPA	in	the	next	few	years.	This	is	
particularly	 important	 if	 the	 pipeline	will	
be	used	to	its	full	capacity	for	the	delive-
ry	of	gas	from	Russia’s	Gazprom.	In	part	
due	 to	 the	date	 the	contract	was	 signed	
(end	of	October	2010),	it	was	not	possible	to	align	the	Polish-Russian	agreement	to	the	
Third	Package	(launched	3	March	2011)	and	it	is	unclear	as	to	whether	and	how	the	con-
tract	will	be	adapted	to	the	provisions	of	this	package.
If	Poland	proceeds	with	its	plans	to	put	in	LNG	regasification	capacity	and	if	in	the	next	
years	shale	gas	proves	to	be	economically	and	environmentally	viable,	there	may	well	be	
occasion	to	test	the	quality	of	the	third	party	access	provisions	that	have	been	negotiated.
The Bulgarian-Russian gas agreement
Towards	the	end	of	2010	the	European	Commission	was	also	invited	by	the	Bulgarian	go-
vernment	to	consult	on	the	contract	then	being	negotiated	concerning	the	establishment	of	
a	Bulgarian-Russian	joint	venture	which	would	be	responsible	for	the	construction	of	the	
Bulgarian	section	of	the	planned	South	Stream	gas	pipeline.	The	Bulgarian	motivation	be-
side	this	request	to	the	EC	was	most	probably	related	primarily	to	increasing	its	bargaining	
power	in	negotiations	with	the	Russian	side.	Here	once	again	the	European	Commission	
pointed	out	the	incompatibility	with	EU	law	of	the	previous	intergovernmental	agreement	
signed	 in	2008,	which	covered	 the	supply	and	 transit	 through	Bulgaria	of	Russian	gas.	
The	European	Commission	called	on	Bulgaria	to	adjust	its	conditions	to	conform	with	EU	
liberalisation	rules,	including	in	particular	the	guarantee	of	third	party	access	to	the	Bulga-
rian	transit	infrastructure.	According	to	media	reports,	the	agreement	in	its	present	shape	
guarantees	Gazprom	full	and	unrestricted	transit	of	Russian	gas3.	Bulgaria	was	most	likely	
only	able	to	partially	adapt	the	agreement	on	South	Stream	to	the	suggestions	of	the	Eu-
ropean	Commission.	However,	although	it	also	promised	to	make	retrospective	changes	to	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
3	 E.g.	http://www.platts.com/
RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSS-
Feed/NaturalGas/8178620
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This event was unprecedented. 
Although the European Commission 
had previously on occasion applied 
pressure on EU companies to make 
their gas supply contracts more 
adherent to EU competition norms  
before now it had not directly partici-
pated in bilateral relations or ongoing 
negotiations between a member 
state and an external fuel supplier.
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the	provisions	of	the	2008	agreement,	to	date	are	no	reports	that	any	actual	modifications	
have	been	made.	Additionally	both	the	Bulgarian	and	Russian	sides	declared	they	would	be	
attempting	to	release	the	Bulgarian	section	of	South	Stream	from	its	obligation	to	ensure	
TPA	(at	least	towards	50-70%	of	the	pipeline’s	capacity)	and	the	head	of	the	South	Stream	
AG	consortium,	Marcel	Kramer,	appealed	for	non-discriminatory	treatment	for	the	project	
to	ensure	a	level	playing	field	with	the	Nabucco	project	promoted	by	the	EU	(which	has	
already	received	exemptions	from	the	TPA	rule).
A full unbundling of the Lithuanian gas sector 
and Russian gas prices
Finally,	in	January	2011,	the	Lithuanian	government	turned	to	the	European	Commission	
with	a	complaint	and	an	appeal	to	look	into	whether	Russia’s	Gazprom	could	be	abusing	
its	dominant	position	on	the	market4.	Lithuania,	which	purchases	its	gas	exclusively	from	
Gazprom	and	which	has	no	infrastructural	possibility	to	import	gas	from	anywhere	else	be-
sides	Russia,	pays	according	to	media	reports	among	the	highest	prices	in	Europe.	The	EU	
has	already	been	indirectly	involved	in	bilateral	Lithuanian-Russian	relations	in	connection	
with	the	implementation	of	the	Third	Liberalisation	Package.	The	Lithuanian	case	currently	
represents	a	crucial	example	–	often	mentioned	by	the	Russian	side	–	of	Gazprom’s	pro-
blems	with	responding	to	the	ongoing	liberalisation	of	the	EU	gas	market.	Gazprom,	besides	
having	the	monopoly	on	fuel	supplies	to	Lithuania,	is	also	joint	shareholder	of	the	most	im-
portant	company	in	the	Lithuanian	gas	market,	Lietuvos	Dujos	(ownership	structure:	38.9%	
–	E.ON,	37.1%	–	Gazprom,	with	the	rest	owned	by	the	state	treasury).	This	company	is	
responsible	for	the	import	and	distribution	of	fuel	and	is	the	operator	of	the	entire	Lithuanian	
transportation	infrastructure.	Lithuania	is	presently	trying	inter alia to	increase	its	influence	
on	 the	development	of	 the	domestic	gas	sector	and	 to	defend	 its	own	 interests	 (in	part	
connected	with	the	cost	of	imported	fuel	but	also	with	the	possibility	of	a	development	of	
its	infrastructure	to	enable	the	diversification	of	supplies).	In	seeking	these	goals	Lithuania	
has	become	one	of	very	few	Central	European	countries5	who	wish	to	launch	a	complete	
ownership	unbundling.	This	has	brought	them	into	a	clear	conflict	of	interests	with	Gazprom	
(and	also	with	Germany’s	E.ON),	which	would	in	that	situation	be	obliged	to	dispose	of	part	
of	its	assets.	Negotiations	on	the	conditions	of	the	implementation	of	the	Third	Liberalisa-
tion	Package	in	Lithuania	are	ongoing,	as	are	negotiations	on	the	method	of	settling	bilateral	
disputed	issues	(besides	unbundling	and	the	issue	of	the	ownership	of	assets,	also	the	cost	
of	Russian	gas	in	Lithuania).	Should	more	specific	solutions	be	worked	out,	a	more	direct	
involvement	for	the	European	Commission	in	the	process	may	not	be	ruled	out.
The goals of the European Commission’s involvement 
in bilateral gas relations
In	the	above	examples,	everything	points	to	the	fact	that	it	is	the	new	member	states	(the	
governments	of	Poland,	Bulgaria	and	Lithuania)	who	are	engaging	the	European	Commis-
sion	in	bilateral	gas	relations	with	Russia.	Although	the	cohesion	of	agreements	drawn	up	
in	line	with	EU	law	is	crucial	for	each	of	those	countries,	it	appears	that	in	engaging	the	
European	Commission,	the	new	EU	member	states	wished	above	all	to	increase	their	nego-
tiating	potential	and	to	improve	the	conditions	of	gas	cooperation	with	Gazprom.
It	 is	also	clear	 that	 the	European	Commission,	 for	several	 reasons,	 is	eager	 to	take	part	
in	 these	negotiations.	Firstly,	 it	 is	 the	European	Commission	 itself	which	safeguards	 the	
conformity	of	new	gas	contracts	–	and	also	those	currently	in	force	–	with	the	principles	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
4	 For	more	on	the	position	of	
Gazprom	in	the	Baltic	states,	
including	Lithuania,	see	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/sites/de-
fault/files/GP_EU_10_09.pdf
5	 Estonia	has	acted	similarly,	
however	the	issue	is	not	
a	topic	of	public	debate,	
e.g.	it	is	not	raised	emphati-
cally	on	the	EU	forum.
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6	 The	directives	came	into	force	
on	3	March	2011,	the	owner-
ship	unbundling	is	however	
set	to	be	launched	on	3	March	
2012	and	the	granting	of	
certificates	allowing	activity	
on	the	EU	market	to	operators	
controlled	by	firms	from	third	
countries	is	set	to	be	comple-
ted	by	3	March	2013.
of	a	liberalising	EU	gas	market.	To	date	these	have	been	mainly	the	provisions	of	the	Second	
Liberalisation	Package	(including	the	guarantee	of	TPA).	Entering	bilateral	relations	gives	
the	EC	additional	instruments	in	its	efforts	to	ensure	this	conformity.	Actions	of	this	type	by	
the	European	Commission	are	aimed	at	ensuring	respect	for	the	provisions	of	EU	law	and	
are	observed	also	in	other	cases,	e.g.	in	Germany	in	connection	with	the	construction	of	
onshore	branches	of	the	Nord	Stream	gas	pipeline	(NEL	and	OPAL).	The	European	Com-
mission	is	at	the	same	time	attempting	to	work	out	principles	for	 implementation	of	the	
Third	Liberalisation	Package6,	including	the	particularly	controversial	(both	within	the	EU	
and	in	the	opinion	of	a	section	of	external	
suppliers)	 provision	 concerning	 unbun-
dling	of	 the	ownership	of	 the	production	
and	 sale	 of	 gas	 from	 its	 transmission.	
The	process	of	working	out	of	these	prin-
ciples	seems	to	be	particularly	essential	in	
countries	strongly	dependent	on	supplies	
of	Russian	fuel	where	Gazprom	is	also	the	
co-owner	 of	 part	 of	 the	 transportation/	
transmission	 infrastructure	 (inter alia	 in	
Poland	and	Lithuania).	Thus	the	way	the	
Russian	 side	 will	 gradually	 adapt	 to	 the	
changing	regulations	on	a	liberalising	gas	
market	and	what	the	cost	of	this	adaptation	will	be	for	member	states	and	the	EU	side,	may	
be	a	crucial	element	in	defining	the	new	modus vivendi	in	EU-Russia	gas	relations.	Finally,	
in	becoming	involved	in	issues	which	until	recently	had	been	the	exclusive	competence	of	
member	states,	the	European	Commission	sees	the	possibility	of	not	merely	a	tempora-
ry	but	also	a	longer-lasting	extension	of	its	role	and	competence	in	energy	relations	with	
third	countries.
Effects to date and the possible further consequences
The	involvement	of	the	EU	(the	European	Commission)	in	the	gas	relations	of	new	member	
states	with	Russia	has	 led	to	some	measure	of	convergence	with	EU	principles	but	has	
in	no	case	ended	in	a	complete	success.	The	most	effective	involvement	for	the	Europe-
an	Commission	 to	date	would	appear	 to	
have	 been	 in	 negotiations	 of	 the	 Polish-
Russian	gas	agreement,	whose	provisions	
were	brought	into	line	with	EU	law.	With	
Lithuania,	merely	the	concept	of	launching	
full	 ownership	 unbundling	 as	 envisaged	
in	 EU	 directives	 represented	 one	 of	 the	
key	 arguments	 and	 instruments	 allowing	
Vilnius	 to	 apply	pressure	 in	 its	 gas	 talks	
with	Moscow.
All	of	the	above	examples	lead	to	the	in-
creasing	visibility	 in	public	debate	of	 the	
importance	 and	 utility	 of	 the	 conformity	
of	bilateral	contracts	with	EU	regulations.	
As	a	consequence,	one	of	the	resolutions	of	the	February	energy	council	of	the	EU	is	that	
member	states	should	as	of	2012	inform	the	European	Commission	about	new	contracts	or	
Although the cohesion of agreements 
drawn up in line with EU law is crucial 
for each of those countries, it appears 
that in engaging the European Com-
mission, the new EU member states 
wished above all to increase their 
negotiating potential and to improve 
the conditions of gas cooperation 
with Gazprom.
The Lithuanian example may turn out 
to be particularly crucial in this, sho-
wing if, how and with what consequ-
ences it is possible to force Gazprom 
to divest part of its assets in order to 
secure the full implementation of EU 
liberalisation rules or whether the EC 
and Member States are doomed to 
accepting sub-optimal compromises 
forcing them in most cases to abandon 
the dream of full ownership unbundling. 
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7	 Conclusions	on	Energy,	Euro-
pean	Council	4	February,	PCE	
026/11,	point	11.
8	 E.g.	Putin	Criticizes	
EU	Energy	Policy,	The	Wall	
Street	Journal	Online,	
25	February	2011.
contracts	currently	in	force	for	fuel	supplies	with	third	countries7.	They	have	also	indirectly	
made	from	the	issue	of	unbundling	and	of	how	Gazprom	operates	inside	a	liberalising	EU	
gas	market	becoming	one	of	the	key	subjects	of	EU-Russia	energy	talks.	The	case	of	Li-
thuania	is	particularly	crucial	in	this	context;	for	example	Prime	Minister	Putin	referred	to	it	
during	his	visit	to	Brussels	in	February	20118.
Nevertheless,	the	long-term	effects	of	this	type	of	EU	activity	depend	on	a	host	of	factors.	
One	of	them	is	the	consistency	of	the	European	Commission	in	launching	the	Third	Packa-
ge.	The	Lithuanian	example	may	turn	out	to	be	particularly	crucial	in	this,	showing	if,	how	
and	with	what	consequences	it	is	possible	to	force	Gazprom	to	divest	part	of	its	assets	in	
order	 to	secure	 the	 full	 implementation	of	EU	liberalisation	rules	or	whether	 the	EC	and	
Member	States	are	doomed	to	accepting	sub-optimal	compromises	forcing	them	in	most	
cases	to	abandon	the	dream	of	full	ownership	unbundling.	One	must	recognise	that	there	
are	a	number	of	European	companies	who	would	not	be	unhappy	with	this	result.
The	 other	 factors	 influencing	 the	 final	 outcome	 of	 present	 developments	 are	 the	 actual	
possibilities	of	institutionalising	this	type	of	European	Commission	activity,	and	the	parti-
cipation	of	 the	EU	representatives	 in	en-
suring	conformity	with	Community	law	of	
commercial	gas	relations	with	third	coun-
tries	/	suppliers	from	third	countries.	It	is	
clear	 that	 few	EU	member	 states	would	
be	willing	to	grant	the	European	Commu-
nity	such	a	role	Nearly	all	companies	and	
many	member	states	would	view	the	 in-
volvement	of	the	European	Commission	in	their	bilateral	negotiations	with	third	countries	
on	the	conditions	of	an	agreement	or	contract	(as	with	Poland)	as	an	infringement	on	their	
exclusive/autonomous	rights.	It	is	difficult	to	assess	the	willingness	of	even	the	‘new’	mem-
ber	states	to	formally	sanction	the	validity	of	not	merely	one-off	but	the	regular	and	also	
extensive	admittance	of	the	EU	side	into	their	gas	relations	with	Russia.
Recently	observed	openness	to	cooperation	with	the	EU	side	was	in	large	measure	caused	
above	all	by	the	asymmetry	of	negotiations	between	them	and	Gazprom.	Involvement	of	the	
European	Commission	was	above	all	simply	exploited	as	an	element	of	the	game	in	play	
(which	could	be,	for	example,	suggested	by	the	Bulgarian	case,	where	the	European	Com-
mission	postulates	concerning	changes	of	the	provisions	in	the	main	gas	contract	between	
Russia	and	Bulgaria	have	not	thus	far	been	met	with	understanding).	Larger	EU	members	
have	greater	bargaining	power	in	relations	with	Russia	and	larger	gas	companies	better	able	
to	go	nose	to	nose	with	Gazprom.
Finally,	it	is	not	clear	how	great	a	determination	the	EU	itself	has	for	launching	the	principles	
of	a	 liberalising	gas	market	 if	 it	might	 jeopardise	 its	own	strategic	relations	with	Russia.	
The	unambiguous	opposition	of	the	Russian	side	towards	certain	provisions	of	EU	directives	
along	with	Russia’s	significance	as	a	supplier	(growing	in	recent	months	in	part	due	to	the	
context	of	conflicts	in	North	Africa	and	the	Middle	East)	may	make	the	European	Commis-
sion	inclined	to	seek	compromise.
It is not clear how great a determina-
tion the EU itself has for launching the 
principles of a liberalising gas market 
if it might jeopardise its own strategic 
relations with Russia. 
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Conclusion 
The	business	of	 liberalising	 the	EU	gas	market	 is	 fraught	with	challenges	–	 internal	and	
external.	These	first	efforts	by	the	Commission	to	help	Member	States	stand	firm	on	Com-
munity	principles	with	external	suppliers	are	a	welcome	sign	that	the	external	dimension	
of	the	third	package	doesn’t	need	to	await	resolution	of	internal	challenges.	Perhaps	the	
biggest	 challenges	 confronting	 the	 Commission	 are	 in	 nurturing	 the	 convergence	 of	 the	
internal	market	practices	of	Member	States,	e.g.	regulatory	policies,	pricing,	integration	of	
infrastructure	decisions,	governance	and	more	generally	a	recognition	that	all	27	Member	
States	are	equal	partners	in	the	same	internal	market.	Here	traditional	market	players	who	
are	comfortable	with	the	status quo ante	will	take	measures	with	an	optic	of	compliance	
with	 the	Third	Package,	but	with	a	 lack	of	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	 reality.	The	positive	 role	
of	the	Commission	in	the	above	examples	will	strengthen	its	hand	on	more	difficult	tasks	
to	come.
